Alan Eschbach, Author
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There But for the Grace of God....

8/22/2017

29 Comments

 
During my military career, one of the things I always resented was when someone from another command, or another world criticized or second-guessed either my actions or the actions of a shipmate without firsthand knowledge of either. I’d typically tolerate the uninformed opinions until the next morning when I could confront the person by saying I had spent the previous night pouring through my cruise books desperately looking for their name or photo, ultimately unable to find either. My point was that unless they had served with me on that ship at the time of the event, they couldn’t possibly know for sure all the details that led to the accident, and would be wise to just be quiet. At least until the facts were known and made public.

I will not pretend to have a clue regarding the circumstances that led to the collisions of USS John S. McCain or USS Fitzgerald so I won’t comment on what might or might not have happened. Nor am I the guy to critique the navy’s process for training and selecting officers for command-at-sea. But what I will say is that sometimes avoiding a collision is much more difficult than you’d think. In fact, I’m surprised it doesn’t happen more often.

In a career that included seven ships, six of them came mere feet away from catastrophes similar to what happened on McCain and Fitzgerald. While roughly half of those near misses were the direct result of ownship negligence or poor watch-standing, the others were caused by either severe weather, low visibility, shipping density, engineering casualties, inherently risky missions in restricted waters, or some combination of those factors. Ironically, it was my tour as Executive Officer aboard John S. McCain that was the only ship on which I had no close calls.

One of my former Commanding Officers, who had previously served as President George H. W. Bush’s naval aide, had an expression he’d say in the wake of an accident; and that was, “It’s a short walk from the White House to the Outhouse.” He said that not to ridicule those involved in the accident, rather it was meant to illuminate the line, the very small line, between success and failure.

Every (and I do mean “every”) post-accident investigation will identify mistakes, either in training and/or execution, that led to the incident. Something has to be identified because no one learns anything from saying that sometimes things just happen, especially when lives are lost. And I'll grant you that most times we did miss something that would have prevented the accident. But sometimes, where multiple and diverse factors beyond our control come in to play at the same time, during an already inherently risky endeavor - tragic accidents happen.
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I have no idea what happened on John S. McCain or Fitzgerald. But what I do know, is that the need to know what caused the accident, although vital to moving forward, is not mine. And quite honestly, thinking about it makes me sick to my stomach for everyone involved, especially those families that do have a need to know what happened to their loved ones. 
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29 Comments
Peter Bachand
8/22/2017 05:21:12 pm

Spot on as usual Alan. I believe another of CAPT Ross sayings was "there is a fine line between a hero and a horse's ass.". I had the deck in JOHN S MCCAIN when you were XO, and almost hit a dhow. It was unlit, did not show on radar, moonless night without a clear horizon and neither me or my watch team saw it until we were in extremis. They turned on their deck lights at the last minute. TAO saw it on the camera and I called the CO who came to the bridge as she was passed and opening just astern. I didn't get yelled at, we had a conversation of what unfolded and as you said, it was one of those instances where training and technology didn't make a difference. The families of the fallen deserve our support without speculation. An investigation will determine what happened and as a fellow mariner, I feel for those who will be held accountable because many will be left with what ifs for a long time.

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Alan
8/22/2017 08:08:00 pm

Thanks Pete. As always, you hit the mark.

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Danny hall It1ret
8/24/2017 06:04:06 pm

Well said sir, that's too close for not anyone or anything to Arlarm them of something like that

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Peter J Bachand
9/17/2017 10:00:06 am

I wanted to add a comment after reading this again. As many CO's have "Command Philosophies", as I became more senior, I also shared my philosophy with those I was privileged to lead, train and mentor. It was only as good as how I LIVED IT !!!!. One of those was "when was the last time you asked yourself the woulda, shoulda, coulda questions". I spent time with EVERY new Sailor going over my "philosophy" and this one went to taking even a few seconds to think about actions before taking them. We all recall events in our youth waiting for "Dad to get home" and thinking to ourselves, "I woulda made a different decision, I coulda not gotten in the car with those people, I shoulda taken time to think it through". My hope being that if even one of my Sailors made a better decision while on that dark windy corner, then it was worth taking the time to discuss it with them. Is it right?, is it safe?, is it ethical? Alan, I can clearly say that in my 35 years, you were as direct and honest as any Shipmate I had, clearly communicating expectations and the knowledge that we had your full support and that you valued EVERY one of your Sailors.

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Ed Wenger
8/22/2017 07:35:35 pm

Well said. Thoughts and prayers to the dedicated sailors who lost their lives, and their families.

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Alan
8/22/2017 08:03:47 pm

Thanks Ed. I know you know all about dangerous and risky undertakings.

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Donny Pieka
8/22/2017 08:16:54 pm

Well said, Al... I've also had a few close calls..often it takes split second decisions by more than one person to avoid disaster...

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Brian Gardler
8/22/2017 09:10:14 pm

Sir..., thank you for sharing your thoughts, as for me, you're the only authority I will look to help me shape my thoughts on these incidents. Watching the dialogue pass back and forth on national / local media, and the discussion on social media among informed / uninformed sources make your comments all the more poignant. Throughout my career, having stood every watch station critically involved in those events, I'd have a hard time reconciling other people's opinions on the actions of my shipmates. Civilians can get a pass, but for Sailors...if you were not ship's company....zip it. I'm on record many times hearing someone referring to DDG 51 as 'already broke', having to explain to them that unless you are / or were a cree member, your opinion isn't relevant. My thoughts and prayers go out to the families and crew of those ships. V/R, Brian

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Alan
8/23/2017 05:51:37 am

Thanks Brian. You kept us safe many times on deployment. Loved serving with you.

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Brian FitzPatrick
8/22/2017 09:21:53 pm

Sir, my thoughts exactly. As one of the few SWOs in Austin, I've been asked about these collisions many times. I've always said, I was not on the bridge or on watch. I cannot speculate as to what happened. I enjoy your writing almost as much as I enjoyed working for you at the Naval Academy. Please keep posting.

V/R,

Fitz

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Alan
8/23/2017 05:53:19 am

Thank you Brian! I appreciate and value your perspective.

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Brian Cole
8/22/2017 09:50:54 pm

People are always looking for a scapegoat, someone to blame. The "Dookie Happens" factor is never taken into account. No matter how safely we drive (our car or our ships) accidents happen. Your take on the situations is totally correct. Too many armchair OOD's like to see themselves on the six o'clock news telling the world "what happened", when they weren't there. I pray for the crews of those ships. I'm sure the truth will come out, especially for the families of those lost, but let the process work and keep the so called experts off the news. No CO, XO, or CMC wants anything bad to happen to their ship or crew.

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Alan
8/23/2017 05:54:42 am

Brian, we shared some great times on GATES. We stood many engineering watches together. I wonder who wrote that watchbill!

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John Hill
8/23/2017 03:27:33 am

As always, so well said. I get so mad with news commentators and armchair quarterbacks who never stood a watch. Never worked past the point of exhaustion to keep the sword sharp. My heart goes out to the families of the JSM. I bet time will show that the crew did a heroic job in saving the ship. Thanks for being a voice of reason for those of us in the engine rooms.

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Alan
8/23/2017 05:55:21 am

Thanks John. I couldn't agree more! Hope you are well.

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Chris Cardona
8/23/2017 10:47:20 am

Thank you for commenting on this in a thoughtful and thought provoking way.

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Alan
8/25/2017 07:52:41 am

Thank you Chris for taking the time to read this.

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Bob Reiher
8/23/2017 11:21:25 am

Sir - serving with you on McCain was instrumental in providing me with a clear example of leadership and how that translates when speaking into the lives of those whom are responsible to you, and that experience changed the entire course of my career. Your perspective here is so greatly appreciated, and I grieve with you and our shipmates who have such a close connection to this ship. Thank you for putting this out there.

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Alan
8/25/2017 07:53:38 am

Bob, thank you. Captain Ross put together a great group. All my best!

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Paul M
8/23/2017 02:50:00 pm

I was of the opinion that the surface community is suffering from a massive basic seamanship competence problem caused primarily by our total neglect of formal officer training. Since SWOSDOC was eliminated in 2003 (which by all accounts itself wasn't particularly effective), we have given JOs some CDROMs or (as I received) 2.5 weeks of canned powerpoints and a few COVE simulator runs before being sent out to a ship I believe the current situation is circa four months of canned powerpoints. I was one of ~20 JOs vying for experience, a situation that I know (anecdotally at least) is not remotely uncommon. Now, DHs and even COs were brought up under this regime, whereby one would expect relative few people to become effective mariners.

So while a close call with an unlit dhow might call for more nuance, these two ships (Fitzgerald beyond doubt at this point) got T-boned 600-800ft ships, and the death toll to uninvolved sailors in their berthings should come to about 20. I proffer that if we, for several generations of commissioning SWOs, do not give any meaningful training, we should expect to severely impair the competence levels of our bridge teams, especially if we let the problem persist for so long that now every layer of command in the wardroom is poorly trained, and reliant on personalities luck-of-the-draw for experience gain. Some people under these circumstances will undoubtedly turn out great, but many will not, and the longer we let it persist the higher rate of incompetence we should expect to see.

No other decent Navy in the world sends virtually untrained officers to operational ships - but puts them through a lengthy and rigorous centralized training pipeline. And no other decent Navy in the world gets into easily avoidable collisions or runs their ships aground in benign navigational circumstances at anywhere near the rate we do.

I think until we realized set ourselves up for a high rate of incompetence in the SWO officer corps, own it, and create a quality training pipeline for JOs (we can just copy any Commonwealth country system) we are going to keep seeing these types of accidents as officer competence further degrades.

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Alan
8/23/2017 03:53:48 pm

Paul, Thank you for your observations. Not that yours are mine to evaluate, but I appreciate your candor and professionalism. I can't dispute one point that you've made. I had a nice conversation with a Royal Naval Officer this morning with respect to their training of commanding officers and it is quite different. (See your comparison of our mishaps to the lack of mishaps for other nations' navies.)

When the time is right (for me) I'll offer my opinion of the timing of when (at what career point) we select officers for command. For me, having been an Engineer, the most important tour in my professional development, especially as a mariner, came during my XO ride. My first look for command at sea, came after that tour when my performance was available to pertinent to the selection board. But I'll save that for another time.

Thanks again for your thoughtful comment. V/R, Alan

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CAPT Michael Riley
8/24/2017 01:53:33 pm

Alan, you're absolutely right. What I always told my OOD's during their qualification boards was, "Anything can happen...and it usually does!" When I saw it was JOHN S MCCAIN was like a "gut punch". I know Pete Bachand must've felt the same. Must be a Sailor thing...

I still remember the first time I saw JSM in BIW. It was the day I reported aboard, as the last wardroom "plankowner". I'll also never forget the hundreds of hours BMCS Moore spent training me to be a good 1st Lieutenant, as well as all time you, CAPT Ross, Larry, and Pete spent making me and a much better SWO.

As I write this I too remember incredibly close calls. Once it was a call of "Captain to the Bridge!" over the 1MC late in the evening. Another, it was that uneasy feeling a Captain gets when you hear the engines spool up and feel the ship change course suddenly. It's amazing how fast you can fly up several decks to the pilot house. In both cases I just happened to be awake, walking my spaces.

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Alan
8/25/2017 07:58:19 am

Mike, great to hear from you! Being topside, as you were, especially on a newly commissioned ship, you and your guys often took the brunt of the wx. You and BMCS Moore ensured McCAIN's safety over and over as we went through our training certs.

Thanks for your comments. I've got more I want to talk about on the blog and look forward to more of your thoughts. Take care Mike.

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Scott Robinson
8/24/2017 06:33:31 pm

Great summary Alan. I wish the peanut gallery would shut up until the Navy can review the incidents in a wholistic manner and make decisions about what needs to change. The past two accidents with the loss of life make this examination a solemn matter.

While today's dynamics are different we should all keep in mind that in the Navy of the 1980's and early 90's we still had accidents - albeit none that led to loss of life to the best of my knowledge. Enterprise hit Bishop's Rock 100+ miles from San Diego, Kinkaid collided with a merchant in the Strait of Mallaca, and Arkansas hit a merchant in the Messina Strait, just to cite a few of the incidents. The loss of life in the recent accidents with Fitzgerald and JS McCain will hopefully result in the leadership producing a clear eyed prescription to fix what is broken.

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Alan
8/25/2017 08:01:19 am

Scott, nice to hear from you! I appreciate the reminder that unfortunately this has happened for years. BELKNAP/JFK, TRIPP and PLATT, etc...

Thanks for your note Scott. Take care, Alan

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Scott Robinson
8/26/2017 11:59:37 am

I am in arrears Alan - congrats on your book being published!

Sam Howard
8/26/2017 07:57:10 am

With you all the way, Alan. Like every person privileged to command ships, I have a list of closer calls and nearer misses during my three ship commands that is longer than I'd like it to be. Most were in the routinely hazardous evolutions in which ships engage but some were very avoidable, with my team and me being able to learn and avoid repeats. I find it interesting that so very few of the chatterboxes opining over the recent tragedies have mentioned that there was another bridge team involved. Granted our destroyers have a maneuvering advantage but neither vessel can abdicate an obligation to avoid collision. Blame after a maritime tragedy of any kind has little use and for this private citizen, the only thing investigation and inquiry will satisfy is my curiosity. It is my prayer that whatever is learned will be useful in preserving Navy blood and treasure in the future, and that this and coming generations of Navy mariners will never forget that lessons at sea we might take for granted are sometimes learned at the cost of lives. Thanks for your leadership at sea a season ago, and for your thought leadership today, my friend.

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Alan
8/26/2017 11:15:31 am

Sam, so well said. Thank you.I am glad you mentioned the other bridge team because I was just saying to Susan how I never saw one negative opinion of a container ship being taken down by pirates because they ignored the Best Maritime Practices put out by the Civil Maritime community. Those ship Masters likely graduated from a Maritime academy and had spent decades at sea and they still got taken down. Thank you Sam for your perspective and your friendship. I value them both a great deal. All my best & V/R, Alan

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Ian Pollitt
8/29/2017 02:52:53 pm

Hi Alan,
Cogently presented argument, as usual. As some others have posted above, I would agree that broadly speaking, the Navy currently suffers from a lack of reps at basic SWO blocking and tackling skills. The age-old argument: too many officers, not enough opportunities. But I'd like to offer that there are some relatively easy steps the community can take as mitigation strategies. Here are two for consideration:
1. The importance of sail training and YP training for Midshipmen cannot be overstated. Relative motion, and the impact of controllable and uncontrollable forces, are best appreciated and understood when wallowing along in a YP or crashing to windward in a NAVY-44. Both platforms are preeminent seamanship laboratories, and in my opinion both are misused. The tendency is to think of them as a means to offer Midshipmen exposure to life at sea; I prefer think of them as SWO immersion training platforms. So the solution is to first identify the prospective SWOS in the Brigade earlier, and then use these platforms to their full capability, as vehicles to drive a substantive summer training program tailored to the life of future 1110's. This would also require expansion and potentially regionalization of the YP/sailing fleets to accommodate ROTC members as well, so everyone shares the same breadth of experience when they hit the fleet. Increased costs? Sure. But how many costly accidents would it prevent?

2. Optimize use of the training opportunities we do have, and reverse the "seamanship evolution-averse" culture. How many times in your career did you see an "A" team mentality on deck for critical events? That's great for the A team, but what about the other 75% of the Wardroom and Chief's Mess? Until leadership teams stop viewing that UNREP as "something to get over with" and start viewing it as a boundless training opportunity, we will never get over the hump on seamanship training. Have OPS program in extra time so that every sea detail includes bouncing off a pier somewhere else in the basin before proceeding to sea, or mooring to the pier. Why only make one approach and breakaway from the oiler, when you can make six? The ROI on these extra hours spent-- both in terms of crew proficiency and crew morale-- is immeasurable.

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